The Governance Analytical Framework

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Summary

The present document presents the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF), a practical methodology which aims to demonstrate the potential of the concept of governance for the analysis of collective problems. Some of the basic postulates of the GAF are that governance processes can be found in any society and can be observed and analysed from a non-normative and non-prescriptive perspective. Unlike many approaches based on ex-ante solutions (where the solution precedes the research), our proposal is that governance may be converted into a methodology to analyse collective processes which determine how decisions are made and how social norms and institutions are created, with reference to public issues. The GAF proposes a system with five analytical principals. These analytical units constitute a coherent and logically structured methodology.

Introduction

There is a notorious absence of conceptual consistency in the use of the term governance, both in academic spheres and by decision-makers. We start with three very simple questions. What sense can we give to the word governance? What does it refer to? What does this concept contribute to social sciences?

There is no commonly agreed and stable definition of governance: “There are almost as many ideas of governance as there are researchers in the field” (Björk et Johansson 2001: 2). However, based on usage, we can distinguish three groups of approaches, viewing governance as: 1º, a synonym for Government; 2º, a normative framework; 3º an analytical framework for non-hierarchical coordination systems.

So that it can be used in scientific research, an approach to governance should both have a defined objective and should propose a methodology. We suggest that existing approaches are assessed on the basis of the following criteria:

(a) added value: does the approach provide something in addition to what already exists?;
(b) scientific character: is it verifiable? (can it be observed empirically?; is it refutable in the sense of allowing tests which allow it to be refuted?; and is it reproducible? – is the experience protocol or the logical approach which led to its formulation applicable to other cases? and can it be generalised (applicable to various types of different situations)?;
(c) operating character: does it allow a methodology to be developed which can be used by a non-specialist? Does it help to identify courses of action?

The three types of approaches are unsatisfactory when assessed on the basis of these criteria, which has led us to propose an alternative approach, which we call the “Governance Analytical Framework”, a tool to systematise the social, political and institutional complexity of the processes for formulating and implementing collective decision, which is described in this document.

The issue of terminology
In Spanish or Portuguese, the term “governança” governance formerly had the meaning of “government”. In modern Spanish, the term has still not been clearly defined. In Spain, the term “gobernanza” is used in relation to the European Union. In Latin America, many international organisations, including Swiss Cooperation, translate it by the term “goberrnabilidad” (governability), which introduces confusion with the original content of the concept of governability (“the capacity of a socio-political system to control itself”, Kooiman, 1994). This same confusion is maintained by the Real Academia Española de la Lengua (Royal Spanish Academy of Language), which recommends the use of gobernanza (governance), but accepts it as a synonym of gobernanabilidad (governability). The term gobernanza can also be found, a neologism (Solá 2000), which we consider to be a synonym of gobernanza.

I. Common approaches

Governance as a “synonym of Government”

This definition of governance is based on its historical use. In fact, the term is of Greek origin, kubernân, which refers to the control of a ship or cart, but which Plato already used in a metaphorical way to talk about humans (Oliveira 2002). In Latin, gubernare has the same meaning as in Greek. In the French of the Middle Ages, it became a synonym of “government”, with an explicitly hierarchical meaning. It took the same meaning in English, Spanish and Portuguese, and then fell into disuse. Some dictionaries or authors still use the term with this meaning. In my opinion, this use has no added value and increases the confusion surrounding the term.

Governance as a “normative framework”

At the end of the 1980s, governance became one of the tools of the World Bank. It was initially used as a methodological tool used for identifying the effective sites of power (Smouts 1998a): “Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. Quickly, the Bank developed a series of quality criteria (in Latin America it was translated as gobernabilidad) aimed at evaluating the norms and practices of States or organisations, and which were applied to set objectives for the Bank’s programmes or to evaluate certain applications for funding. Although the organisations which advocate good governance have no definitive, homogenous list, examples of these criteria are those given by the World Bank Institute: 1. voice and accountability; 2. political stability and absence of violence; 3. government effectiveness; 4. regulatory quality; 5. rule of law; 6. control of corruption.

1 The World Bank Institute (WBI) defines governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Accessed March 22, 2007, [http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20678937-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:1740530,00.html](http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20678937-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:1740530,00.html).

It is directed mainly at developing countries. For its critics, the nature of the criteria chosen, their inclusion into the panoply of conditionalities imposed by bilateral and multilateral development cooperation agencies, leading to an indiscriminate promotion of the market economy, and the very fact of imposing these criteria, are the cause of much misunderstanding and resistance.

At the World Bank, governance has become a political tool for changing societies rather than an analytical approach. Its use has normative connotations, and refers to what “should be” and not to what “is”. Without prejudging the political basis of this approach, the criteria proposed are not refutable in fine. They are inspired by political practices, philosophical principles and objectives inherent to certain specific societies. Other practices and principles are conceivable, with other types of objectives, equally legitimate in their society of origin. Good governance is located firmly outside the scientific domain.

The divergence between practices (for example, the procedure for granting tree-cutting permits in region X of country Y) and the criteria for good governance (for example the need to be aware of the norms in advance, transparent procedures, or the possibility of an appeal to an independent Court of Justice, etc.) can be fully studied using a scientific methodology (for example, using a questionnaire completed by the various bidders for these permits). Significant resources are dedicated to the development of such methodologies, which allow us to obtain a precise description of the situation. Clearly, when the result obtained is judged “good” or “bad” it falls under another type of reasoning, which is both irrefutable and normative. The problem is that there is no objective criteria to allow choosing between two normative options but philosophical (linked to reason) or political choice (linked to power relations).

**Governance as an “analytical framework for non-hierarchical coordination systems”**

Three schools of thought may be associated with this approach. They are characterized by the following general tenets: there are multiple and different actors and decision-making sites; the relationships between the actors are horizontal rather than vertical; the interactions are self-regulated.

**“Corporate governance”**

The first school of thought is linked to the governance of organisations, which appeared in the United States with the development of government sciences. It was developed on the basis of the analysis of the monitoring mechanisms for two types of organizations, universities (Olsen 1976) and companies (Coase 1937). It was observed that the control of organization was no longer (according to the analytical version) and should not be (according to the normative version) purely hierarchical. Therefore it was necessary to observe and formulate theories regarding the specific mechanisms and institutions which allow coordination between the units of an organisation, arbitration of differences, maintenance of cohesion and management of the transaction costs involved through a control which is more “horizontal” than “vertical” (and, in the normative version, to promote them).

According to Williamson, one of the key authors of the school of thought called neo-institutionalist, who was inspired by the works of Ronald Coase, the structure of institutions, such as the company or the market, gives rise to a variety of structures and mechanisms for governance. They have problems with specific transaction and

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contractualisation costs, which is precisely the focus of the study of governance (Williamson 1979; 1984; 1996).

This school of thought gave birth to a normative approach, which is described, for example, in the “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”, a series of criteria very close in form and content to those of good governance. Its intention is to draw up “a common basis that OECD member countries consider essential for the development of good governance practices” (OECD, 2004: 11). These proposals reflect the practices and thinking in management which are currently fashionable. They are deeply inspired by the contractual approach, mentioned above, which is close to the neoclassical school.

Other approaches, such as cognitive and evolutionist theories, based on an analysis in terms of procedural rationality, would give rise to different criteria. They are more concerned with the processes through which competences or innovation capacity are created, than in the outcomes of the decisions taken (Charreaux 2003).

Global governance

The second school of thought is linked to international relations. It appeared in the 1980s, also in the United States. According to the “realist” approach to international relations, which reached its zenith in the 1950s, there is no supra-state entity in the international system, which could, for example, arbitrate conflicts among states. This situation is called “anarchic”. However, two factors gradually came to modify this vision. Firstly, the number of actors present on the international scene was multiplied (multinational companies and syndicates, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, etc.) Secondly, international life was institutionalised; many complex agreements (international conventions, regional integration, etc.) were created, structuring international life. They are called “international regimes” (Krasner 1982) when they are specific to particular spheres. The concept of governance allows us to understand the process of drawing up these agreements which are aimed at resolving problems of coordination beyond the centralizing authority of a State (Rosenau 1987).

The inclusion of non-state actors, often at national or local level, allows the breakdown of the traditional dichotomy domestic policy/international policy of the “realist” approach. It also allows us to take into consideration the fact that actors intervene at different levels, depending on strategies which are often complex. “Global” governance includes all levels of analysis. Regional cases, such as the European Union, are understood as a type of “multilevel governance”.

The Commission on Global Governance (1995), which met in the early 1990s on the initiative of chancellor Brandt to reflect upon the post-Cold War world, produced a definition worth mentioning. Governance was defined as follows:

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

From an analytical point of view, this perspective is innovative. All the actors, whether official or not, are considered. Unlike the relatively limited approach of international public law, both formal and informal agreements are included and the perspective is procedural, taking into consideration the continuous changes in relationships between the actors. It also represents an important analytical challenge, and from a critical point of view, presents a major weakness, also associated with its normative version, which
aims to establish order in international governance (as in the case of the Commission on Global Governance). Aiming above all to solve problems of cooperation and decision-making, the promoters of global governance emphasise consensus and pay little attention to relative power issues in international relations. The use of this concept suffers from the same problems as the “international regime”, and in particular it does not question the nature of the agreements reached and their suitability for fundamental problems (Smouts 1998b).

“Modern Governance”

For the third school of thought, which is thematically close to political science, governance allows questions to be asked about the role of the State in society (Pierre & Peters 2000), as well as the internal management of the State and especially public administration. The concept is used as an instrument for analysis, and also for action, with the aim of contributing towards the solution to the crisis in governance of States.

In analogy with the international relations’, this school of thought is linked to the perception (and discourse) that the State has lost or delegated an increasing proportion of its power and its competences to various local, national and international “entities”. The manner of conducting public affairs has changed very rapidly over the last twenty years, especially under the effect of the Welfare State and the end of the Fordist model of production (the tacit agreement for increasing productivity in exchange of increased wages and social peace that led the period 1950-1980 in the industrialized countries). Many mechanisms for the production or regulation of public assets (goods or services produced by the State or a public community) have been outsourced. In many spheres, the hierarchical rationality of the State has given way to networks of autonomous and interdependent actors and to agreements, considered as institutions at a national level or as regimes at the international level, upon which the states become dependent. This is the meaning of “modern governance” according to Kooiman (1993) or Rhodes (1996).

The establishment of a typology of the methods of regulation constitutes an important step towards conceptual clarification. According to Jessop (1998), for example, there are three ideal types of mechanisms for the regulation of society: hierarchical (by the authorities), economic (by the market) and heterarchical (by self-organised networks and associations). These three mechanisms have always co-existed, but in a variety of configurations. What Jessop characterizes as governance is the current expansion of the heterarchical model to the detriment of the others, leading, in his opinion, to a real breakdown.

This phenomenon is associated with “globalisation” (Beaud et al. 1999): accelerated circulation of capital, standardisation of methods of consumption, regional integration processes, internationalisation of civil society (Edwards & Gaventa 2001) and companies. It is also due to the “hollowing-out” of the State as a consequence of neo-liberal policies: opening of markets, decentralisation, new public administration, privatisation, etc. (Hufty 1999).

This “great transformation”, to paraphrase Polanyi, questions the relevance of an analytical perspective centered on the state and logically leads to the search for a concept capable of describing this new type of regulation. The concept of governance arose in the 1990s as a political and intellectual response. From the intellectual point of view, what is sometimes called the Anglo-governance school (Marinetto 2003) brings together researchers who see in governance a specific historical form taken by the relations between politics and institutions, especially in Great Britain and Europe.
However, this analysis presents certain failings. (1) The “hollowing-out” and the weakening of the State still remains to be demonstrated. Various analysts have indicated that by concentrating on its principal functions, the State was in fact reinforced, including with relation to stakeholders known as autonomous (Holliday 2000). (2) It is based essentially on studies carried out in industrialised countries and over a relatively short period of time. However, as pointed out by several studies, the cycles of public policies extend over periods of 20 to 40 years (Sabatier 1999). (3) Consequently, and if it is accepted that governance refers to a specific historical form, the concept should disappear when this specific historical form changes. (4) Non-European countries seem to be *a priori* excluded from this analysis, as its scope is far from universal. (5) This analysis does not offer a specific methodology. Most of the texts which include this analysis only include general analyses and a perspective which mainly emphasises common sense (“the State gets weaker, the other stakeholders get stronger”) and are steeped with an ideology which characterised the 1980s, neo-liberalism. How, in contexts very different from democracies, in the transition States or “fragile” States can we observe a greater importance of networks with relation to the hierarchy? It quickly becomes impractical and useless to observe these proposals empirically, with respect to the acquisition of knowledge it brings about.

This school of thought also has its normative version. Governance is presented as a solution to the state’s current crisis of governability, where the overload of social demands and the State’s decreased room for manoeuvre lead to the failure of centralised hierarchical regulation (Merrien 1998). Governance through networks would replace the hierarchical solutions and the State would simply play a role as “facilitator”. A specific solution to the State crisis is thus proposed.

For a moderate critic, this proposal veers towards idealism. Directed towards cooperation between actors, it minimises the conflict dimension of human societies. It presents policy-making as a search for consensus which takes place between people with goodwill and who are equally equipped with resources, in an a-historical context. North-South or internal (within States) inequalities are eliminated in the study of decentralisation, new public administration, new communication technologies, international negotiations and other phenomena guided by a commercial or technocratic logic. There is therefore a risk that its validity may be limited to “the narrow spaces within which the actors share a minimum common referential” (Smouts 1998a).

For more radical critics, this proposal represents a second historical phase of putting limits on democracy. The dominant were astonished to discover that citizen participation, which triumphed at the beginning of the twentieth century, did not lead to revolution. Through the establishment of the Welfare State, inspired by Bismarck, they then guaranteed the appeasement of the citizen-voter. However, the weakening of the Welfare State at the end of the 1970s called for a new type of control. This was found in governance. “Civil society” replaced the people; horizontal mechanisms of bargaining and agreement between co-opted sectors replaced deliberation in political bodies; the authorities obtained legitimacy through economic results and not through their electoral mandate, as in the authoritarian regimes from 1950-80 (Hermet et al. 2005).

II. The Governance Analytical Framework

From the approaches above, we have come up with a series of proposals, based upon which we have created an alternative approach, which we call “Governance Analytical Framework”.
Governance is a category of social facts or a subject of study. It refers to “the processes of interactions between the actors involved in a collective issue that lead to decisions and the formulation of social norms”.

It is a concept which can be generalised. In any society, whether local, national or international, at any time in its history, a process of governance can be observed; it is not a phenomenon limited to our time; this function is necessary in any society. Decisions must always be made and decision-making systems, social norms (legal or in common law) and institutions\(^4\) are required, allowing members of a society to live together and cooperate, even in a society without a state\(^5\). It is not equivalent to the “political system”, which is much more comprehensive and characterises a specific form of society, the Nation State. Nor is it equivalent to public policies, which are the actions of a legal authority, generally the central State.

It is not a normative or prescriptive concept; governance, as defined here, as a social fact, “is”. It is not \textit{a priori} either good or bad, but it has characteristics which can be analysed and interpreted. Each society develops its own methods of governance, its systems for decision-making or conflict resolution between its members, norms and institutions. It can also be analysed in a non-normative and non-prescriptive way (although from an epistemological point of view, any theory or element required for analysis is based \textit{in fine} on values). Therefore, governance is not a “model” which it is “desirable to encourage”, and there are different levels of governance.

To be able to study governance, a methodology which serves as a reference for the observation process is required. An analytical framework is a coherent set of models (schematic representations of a situation) associated with a methodology which allows a connection to be made between theoretical proposals (generalisations) and empirical observation. This proposal defines certain fundamental criteria: the analytical framework must be realistic, interdisciplinary, comparative, generalisable, reflexive and operational.

“Realistic” refers to its capacity to describe the facts as they are, and not as they should be, unlike normative perspectives.

\textit{Interdisciplinarity} is defined by Jollivet and Legay (2005: 184) as "a research approach constructed using methodical knowledge, opinions and work techniques from different disciplines". It assumes active cooperation between researchers from various disciplines to expand their understanding of a particular phenomenon or for the completion of a common project. The first step towards interdisciplinarity is the joint construction (or reconstruction) of an objective, which should not then be divided between the disciplines, but should remain collective. From a theoretical point of view (practice forces us to look at things differently), disciplines are not eliminated, specialised knowledge is obviously the product of contributions from different disciplines; they must be coordinated to define the objective, the methodology and the specific contribution of each to a global project.

Evidently, these mechanisms require a deep theoretical epistemological reflection. The conflict between the desire for precision and accuracy, which requires greater specialisation, and that of being subject to reality, where any reduction in the subject imposes a loss of meaning, is particularly important in the case of research-action. Understood in a general sense as a recurrent process of interaction between an

\(^4\) Recurrent systems of social norms which guide and sanction the actions of individuals and groups. This concept should not be confused with that of “organisation” which has personnel, a recognised structure, hierarchy, division of labour, resources and an overall purpose.

\(^5\) This point is theoretical, given the current domination of the Nation State, but many regions of the world escape national sovereignty (zones “liberated” by guerrillas, with civil wars, or isolated indigenous peoples, etc.)
investigation and the application of the results as evidence, there are various versions. The “pragmatic research-action” openly champions democratic or participative social change: "valid social knowledge is derived from practical reasoning engaged in through action" (Greenwood & Levin, 1998: 6). The transdisciplinary approach which was developed in German-speaking countries suggests the involvement of the actors in the research process (Pohl, 2001; Häberli et al., 2001).

Therefore, this approach breaks away from an approach closely linked to political science and makes governance a “bridge concept” (Hufty et al., 2006) between disciplines: sociology, anthropology, law, economy, geography, etc. Technically, it is “narrow interdisciplinarity” limited to social and human sciences, and not including life or natural sciences.

This methodology is comparative and generalisable: it also assumes that various configurations or models of governance and their different effects on any variable considered as dependent can be measured. It requires an analytical framework, indicators which can be measured empirically and appropriate observation methods.

If we assume that it is impossible for researchers to be completely neutral and take into account the multiple references made by various authors to the changes introduced into social situations simply by the fact of observing them, then the researchers are considered as actors. The above involves a reflexive perspective by researchers, which takes into account their interactions with the other actors, and the consequences which arise from these contacts.

The governance processes of various societies, in various places and times, have different characteristics which can be analysed with the help of a methodology which we call the “governance analytical framework.”

The analytical framework proposed consists of five analytical categories: the problems; the actors; the nodal points; the norms; the processes. The problems are the issues which are at stake. The stakeholders are individuals or groups. Their collective action (agreements or decisions) leads to the formulation of norms (or rules of play, or decisions) which guide the behaviour of the actors and are modified by collective action. Collective action results from interaction between actors, whether conflicting or cooperative, from the transactions, agreements and the decisions which are taken and from their application. Interactions may be observed at nodal points, physical or virtual interaction interfaces where problems, processes, actors and norms converge. Processes are successions of states of the interrelations between stakeholders, norms and nodal points. Processes, stakeholders and norms may be formal, that is, recognised by actors who hold authority in the society observed (this recognition is “legal” for societies with positive law), or informal, defined by the practices of the actors.

From the perspective of operationality, governance may be considered as an intermediary variable. It both produces effects on a dependent variable (example: the problem of equal access to social security services), and also depends on independent variables which affect it (example: the institutional organisation of the social security system). For its part, it is probable that governance constitutes only one factor among others, which contributes to explaining the problem being studied (multi-causality).

Table 1: Governance as an intermediary variable

| Independent variable Factors x, x₁, x₂ | Intermediary variable Governance | Dependent variable Impacts y, y₁, y₂ |
Based on the use of the categories of analysis, the methodology then aims to identify the way in which governance influences the dependent variables chosen. It tries to identify whether there are characteristics of the nodal points which are favourable or unfavourable towards changing the problem being studied.

Table 2 shows a simplified example, which represents governance as an independent variable. It is understood that, through analysis of the nodal points and interaction processes (in this case the interaction of 4 nodal points), the specific place of intervention can be identified (nodal point B) to obtain a change in the problem being studied (inequity).

Table 2. Intervention methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Problem: inequity</th>
<th>Solution: more equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nodal points</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Norms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Historical processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Intervention |

Definition of the Problem

Generally speaking, the GAF is used to analyse situations in which a “problem” is the subject of a governance process, for example, unequal access to public health, deforestation in a protected area, or where the interaction of stakeholders produces a lower result than expected. The first phase and the analytical part of the GAF is therefore to understand and clearly define the problem or the issue at stake.

This phase is based on the postulate that any problem is a social construction. What is at stake may be completely different for each stakeholder involved in a governance process. Each protagonist has their own understanding of what is at stake (including the observer, the person or group using the GAF to make a diagnosis). This is explained by the position occupied in society and also by stories, cultures, orders, objectives and specific discourses, which may be qualified as “universes of signification”. Any social interaction, including conflict itself, is a meeting of these universes. In undertaking a GAF study, we must above all accept this plurality of visions, which involves taking a step back in our perspective as observer or stakeholder. It is a fundamental step for a realistic analysis and possible solution.

Therefore, a first tool is to “deconstruct” and “reconstruct” the problem. As an example, given a protected territory at the centre of incompatible and conflicting demands, deforestation and loss of biological diversity may be the main problem for ecologists, but for the farmers it is land ownership, for the indigenous people it is access to resources and the maintenance of the integrity of the territory, for the forestry companies it is access to the wood, for an oil company it is access to sub-soil mineral resources, for the state it is the balance between economic development, conservation and social peace.
Therefore, the party which defines what is at stake and identifies the problem itself forms part of what is at stake and is the subject of a power struggle. It is obvious that any social relationship involves power relationships and the definition of the problem at stake may be imposed by force or by persuasion. The party which has greater resources can influence the definition of the issue. However, it is highly probable this will lead to discontent and to passive or active forms of resistance. A more subtle way of imposing one’s will is symbolic violence, convincing other agents to agree with the dominant preferences, such as in the patron-client relationship. In unequal relationships, the definition of the problem shall probably include these ways of thinking.

With the help of discussions with the stakeholders, or actors, literature reviews, and a transformation of the social problems identified (“my children are sick and I can’t buy medications”) into sociological problems (“access to medications is unequal”), the problem may be “reconstructed”. For the observer, the capacity to overcome what the actors present as a problem and convert it into a sociological question depends greatly on the context, methodology, techniques and experience.

The Norms

What is at stake is above all social norms, that is, firstly, the rules of the game at an initial level, and the rules which determine who defines the rules of the game and how, at a second level. Whenever there is a society, agreements and decisions between actors, as a consequence of governance processes, lead to the formulation of norms (generally defined as the collective expectations regarding what is considered appropriate behaviour in a given society). Norms guide the behaviour of the actors and are modified by collective action, as “classic” institutional economics teaches us (Commons 1934). Norms are based on values or beliefs (the sense of what is right is right or wrong) and includes prescription (what one should or should not do). They influence the behaviour of the agent and are modified by collective action. When the norms recur, they are institutionalised. They can then be studied as institutions, which involves a theory of institutions. Our choice is based on a “classic” and evolutionary approach (T. Veblen, J.R. Commons, etc.).

Norms should be understood here from a sociological point of view. They can be legal (inscribed in the positive law of the Nation State), formal (recognised by the authorities of the society studied) or informal (created by the practices of the actors). Legal science or legal anthropology may be called upon to make these distinctions. In reality, the important thing for an analysis is not the nature of a norm, but its effectiveness. It is important to state that various normative systems may be superimposed or be in competition or co-exist at the same time for the same society.

This situation of normative pluralism may constitute a major source of conflict. The objective of the actors is to determine which are the norms regarding the issues at stake, who will have the right or the legitimacy to formulate these norms, and which norms will determine how the rules of the game are defined between the actors. Norms therefore constitute a key issue and are the reason for competition between actors and the basis of political relationships, whether through the use of power (the capacity to modify a socially-limited behaviour by the pressure under which the actors operate), or strategic techniques or manoeuvres. (Goodin & Klingemann, 1998).

The application or respect of norms depends on specific factors which require theories (power, legitimacy, sanctions, etc.). Discovering why a law is not respected requires a variable depending on governance, and therefore the application of the framework proposed here.
Norms may be of three types, which in themselves refer to different levels of analysis:

- Firstly, meta-norms refer to premises or principles which guide the social contract in its widest sense, defining criteria and structural values.
- Secondly, constitutive norms define the organisational or institutional mechanisms related to the sectoral operation of the object or scenario under analysis.
- Thirdly, regulative norms, or rules, define the rules of conduct which state what is appropriate, in the eyes of society, in terms of behaviour, what each person must or can do, and state positive (approval or reward) or negative (disapproval or punishment) sanctions.

Norms also express the multi-level aspect of governance. They may be formulated at various levels and transferred to others. Norms are often created on a national level, transferred to international level and sometimes to other countries by international mechanisms, where they are then transferred to the local level. At each level, there is a process of reaction, rejection or internalisation and adaptation. For example, the meta-norm of local participation became a dominant norm throughout the international regime of development cooperation. It was transferred to the world of conservation through international financing mechanisms. Today, participatory conservation (whether it is fiction or reality in practice) is the dominant norm when a protected area is set up, even in the most isolated corner of Latin America. To analyse the processes of change in social norms we suggest the use of a matrix which allows the division of the phases in the process of producing the norms, analysis of the various levels and recognition of the relationships of mutual influence. This process is illustrated by the following Table.

**Table 3. Matrix of Analysis of Norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilevel analysis of norms</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Actors**

In a dynamic analysis of the processes of governance, social norms are closely linked to the actors, their conduct and interactions and conditioned by their nature, power, interests, ideas and history. The postulate here is that all the stakeholders (individuals or groups) are included in the analysis, whether “formal or informal” (recognized by the authorities or not), without prejudice. For example, social networks form part of the real situation for each organised society, but are not usually included in an analysis of actors, despite their importance in many decisions. Of course, not all agents have the same influence in an arrangement. This is why we propose a subset of tools directed at analysing the resources available and the methods of influence of each actor in the process of governance considered.

A first tool is a descriptive grid, which shows the characteristics of the actors (state, references, resources controlled, discourses, means of action...).
Table 4. Description of actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Actor 1</th>
<th>Actor 2…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal level or category (organization of the State on a national, provincial, municipal level, non-governmental…)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status (formal-informal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources controlled (economic, cultural, relational, symbolic…)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs or ideologies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modes of expression and action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nucleus of formal and real responsibilities or functions covered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space of intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on the problem studied</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The identification of the different types of resources controlled or mobilised by the actors includes symbolic and economic resources and social or cultural capital. There is a relationship between actors, resources and the power or capacity to influence the nature of the relationships network, and the rules and procedures established. The type of resources controlled, their use by a stakeholder and the ability to mobilise them according to their own interests strengthens their power to determine or change the rules of the game. The methodology therefore proposes a situational analysis of the relative power of the actors. There are four variables: the resources controlled (economic, social, cultural, symbolic…); the will and capacity to mobilise these resources; effective mobilisation in the governance process analysed; strategic interaction with other actors. Two dimensions must be considered in an empirical evaluation: the objective dimension of these variables (for example, what financial resources an actor has available) and the subjective dimension, which depends on the perception of the actors. This last dimension is very important; the capacity of appearing more powerful than in reality is a significant resource in a strategic interaction.

Without prejudging the methodology used by the observer, we propose a classification of the actors into three categories according to these four variables: “strategic actors”, “relevant”, and “secondary”. The analysis logically concentrates on the strategic actors. The conceptual development by Prats (2001) allows us to define them as “any individual, organization or group with sufficient power resources to hinder or disturb the functioning of the rules or procedures for decision-making and resolution of collective conflicts. Additionally, the relevant actors are actors involved in the institutional fabric and who possess the resources required to be considered as strategic, but who do not use these resources or are dominated in the process. Secondary actors do not have sufficient power to change the rules of the game.

Table 5. Importance of the actors according to 4 variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Will</th>
<th>Mobilisation</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The nature of the interactions between the actors may be categorised according to classic institutional economics (J.R. Commons) and social anthropology (M. Mauss) into four types:

- **Negotiation transactions** determine the collective rules relating to the transfer of ownership rights for an object or work (e.g. a purchase, salary). They assume a relationship of equality between the actors, which can (but should not) be guaranteed by a third party. The transaction relationship which is created, from persuasion to coercion, depends on the bargaining power of each of the actors present.

- **Directive transactions** organize the production of goods and services and work relations according to the principle of efficiency. The actors are in a relationship of economic and legal inequality, where one orders and another obeys, following the rules fixed by the negotiation transactions.

- **Distribution transactions** organise the rationalisation and distribution of wealth produced according to the principle of being subject to the government or authorities. It assumes a relationship of inequality between the actors and that those who are subject to respect the decisions taken by the sovereign, are forced to do so by the threat of violence.

- **Reciprocity transactions** are a foundation of “social capital”. They correspond to the “gifts and counter-gifts” of Mauss (whether direct or indirect) and involve a system of moral debt, but at the same time of reinforcement of social relationships. A particular type of interaction is the network. The identification of networks, often informal and linked to optional affinities or to reciprocity transactions, may be an important key to understanding certain phenomena.

Various combinations of these four types of interactions correspond to types of relationships, such as clientelism, commerce, family, etc. These types should be developed theoretically, based on observations from the field.

**Nodal Points**

Nodal points are understood as “social interfaces”, defined as physical or virtual spaces (for example, a negotiating table, the local council, etc.) where various problems, actors, processes (in time and space) converge, and where decisions are taken, agreements concluded and social norms created. They are an interesting entry point for the observation of governance processes.

Table 7. Nodal points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nodal points</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interaction in space and time</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Stakes (norms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</table>

This analysis aims to recognise the formal and informal nodal points which form part of the fabric of decision-making spaces. The identification of different nodal points, their characterisation, the relationships and their effects on the dependent variables allow an analysis of the existing conditions, and whether they are favourable or unfavourable to a process of change.

**Processes**

Processes are successions of states through which a system passes. They introduce a historical aspect to governance models. In this way, it is possible, for any given object, or a
nodal point, to identify sequences which allow us to evaluate the direction in which these processes are evolving and to locate factors which favour change. The analysis of processes of change aims to identify the patterns of evolution of the nodal points, the fabric of interactions between actors and their relation with the changes of the rules of the game.

Table 8. Interaction of nodal points in a governance process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nodal Point A</th>
<th>Nodal Point B</th>
<th>Nodal Point C</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, we hope that with this model we have improved upon earlier approaches. It at least attempts to transform a rather vague and often contradictory concept into an empirical methodology with rigorous criteria. It is being subjected to trials in various case studies and should still be considered as work in progress. So we hope, with this modest contribution, that we can contribute to advancing understanding of the situation.

**Bibliography**


